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INTRODUCTION
As corporations consider approaches for doing business in or near 
unstable parts of the world, some will face increased concerns for whether 
they are taking appropriate steps to ensure employee safety.  Corporations 
lacking the internal resources to establish security protocols for higher-risk 
locales may choose to outsource that function to private security 
contractors.  Viewpoints on doing so can differ. 
 *   A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D., UCLA School of Law; Partner, Strawn Pickens 
LLP, Houston, Texas, USA. 
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Critics note that private security companies have, at times, generated 
controversy and attracted negative publicity.1  On the other hand, a multi-
national corporation’s sending its employees into potentially hazardous 
regions of the world - without adequately providing for employee or 
facility safety - poses its own of set of reputational and legal risks.2
Responsible private security companies can help some companies 
responsibly manage those risks.3
Incidents involving a private security company’s use of force in 
response to real or perceived threats can and do occur, however.  Those 
affected by these incidents sometimes elect to pursue legal action in the 
United States - perhaps with the perception that the U.S. legal system may 
be more transparent and efficient than that in their home country.4
Claimants may also view the U.S. court system as more able to provide a 
more just (or financially appropriate) remedy.5
This article provides some background on the private security industry 
and how it has evolved principally from serving sovereigns or governments 
to also serving the private sector.  This article also discusses the types of 
legal action that corporations may face if they retain private security 
companies to provide for employee or facility security outside the United 
 1.  See, e.g., Audrey Gillan, Blackwater: Private U.S. Security Firm Mired in Iraq 
Controversy, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2009, 11:46 PM), https://www.the guardian.com 
/world/2009/jan/29/blackwater-iraq-security-contractor [https://perma.cc/4NKJ-HG7U] 
(describing controversies involving the private security contractor Blackwater). 
 2.  See, e.g., Patrick Sullivan, Family of Man Killed in Iraq Sues Contractor, RECORD-
EAGLE (June 5, 2009), http://static.record-eagle.com/2005/jun/05hulett.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WLD9-SFYD] (detailing the story of an employee killed while working 
for the corporation Halliburton in Iraq); Grieving Daughter Sues Halliburton, CNN MONEY,
(Mar. 31, 2005, 10:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/31/news/international/ 
iraq_halliburton/ [https://perma.cc/XAD7-AZHC] (describing a lawsuit against Halliburton 
alleging the company did not properly protect one of its employees who was killed in Iraq). 
 3.  See Kevin Strom et al., The Private Security Industry: A Review of the Definitions, 
Available Data Sources, and Paths Moving Forward § 2.1 (unpublished report, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, on file with National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Dec. 2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHA8-UZ2T] 
(noting experts attending American Society for Industrial Security International (ASIS) 
symposium identified risk management as one of 18 core elements of private security field).  
 4.  See, e.g., Holding Private Security Contractors Accountable: The Case Against 
Blackwater, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RTS. NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Constitutional Rts. 
Justice, New York, N.Y.), Winter 2007  1-2, http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/ 
files/newsletters/CCR_Newsletter_winter07.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J3K-47PQ] (noting that 
a suit brought on behalf of Iraqi citizens in U.S. alleged that a private military contractor 
“fostered a culture of lawlessness . . . encouraging them to act in company’s financial 
interests at the expense of human life”). 
 5.  Id. (alleging further that the State Department’s “action demonstrates the 
importance of civil damages cases . . . for seeking justice when the government is protecting 
corporate interests at the expense of human life”) (emphasis added). 
39083 ple_19-3 S
heet N
o. 47 S
ide A
      05/11/2017   10:58:06
39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 47 Side A      05/11/2017   10:58:06
C M
Y K
3_PICKENS_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/17 5:33 PM
2017] DEFENDING ACTIONS AGAINST CORPORATE CLIENTS 603 
States, if incidents occur, and if legal action is brought in the U.S.  Finally, 
this article reviews legal arguments which have been successful when 
defending corporations in these actions.  Certain of these arguments are 
distinct to this area of litigation. 
I. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
In today’s parlance, the term “private military company” (“PMC”) 
usually connotes a firm providing surrogate military services to a 
government or sovereign.  PMCs are often associated with the furnishing of 
military or military-support services which employer or host countries lack 
the ability or inclination to provide for themselves, and outsource to a 
private sector entity.6
The term “private security company” (“PSC”) can have different 
connotations, indicating firms which are apt to be limited to providing 
security services for corporate personnel or privately-owned installations, 
and also for certain governmental personnel or dignitaries traveling outside 
their home countries.7
In practice, the distinction between PMCs and PSCs can be blurry.  
Certain firms offer both types of services.8  And within a single firm, 
personnel and resources may migrate between providing military and 
support services for governments and providing security for private 
corporations - depending on demand, conditions to be addressed, etc.  For 
example, noted PMC/PSC Aegis Defense Services describes itself as “a 
major security provider to the US government” but as also having “a 
significant portfolio of [o]il and [g]as sector clients.”9
A. Alumni of western militaries often populate well-regarded PMCs 
and PSCs. 
Reputable PMCs or PSCs typically originate in militarily-advanced 
 6.  James M. O’Brien, Private Military Companies:  An Assessment 4 (Sept. 2008) 
(unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California) (on file with author), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3961/08Sep_OBrien.pdf?sequen 
[https://perma.cc/ULZ9-9HDA] (noting “proxy military companies fall under the larger 
PMC definition”). 
 7.  Id. (opining that “private security companies are a type of PMC, but with a 
comparatively reduced mission set”). 
 8.  Id. (commenting on a firm which acts as a “prototypical ‘all-purpose’ private 
military company.”). 
 9.  Security Companies, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. (last updated June 19, 2016), 
http://iraq.usembassy.gov/consular/us/resources/security_companies.html 
[https://perma.cc/8KCJ-VK4V].  
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countries.10  Former officers of developed nations’ militaries tend to hold 
leadership positions in more reputable firms.11  Military personnel’s 
migrating into work with PMCs or PSCs has been attributed to several 
causes including military downsizing, early retirement incentives, and the 
financial benefits of PMC employment12 as compared to regular military 
pay.13  While even elite soldiers’ salaries may be like those of mid-level 
government employees, some - but by no means all - contract PMC 
personnel can be compensated with per-day rates resembling those of 
private-sector consultants.14
Of interest to both tax-payers and potential clients, a Congressional 
Budget Office (“CBO”) report notes that the costs of certain private 
security contractors are comparable to those of a U.S. military unit 
performing similar functions, particularly when peacetime breaks are 
considered.15  During peacetime, private contracts need not be renewed, 
 10.  The Private Military Companies Perspective, in HOUSE OF COMMONS-SELECT
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Ch. 2.1 (Aug. 1, 2002), 
http://www.publications.parliment.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/2061322.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4XJ8-VYB7] (describing how PMCs and PSCs generally originate in 
advanced, western countries). 
 11.  PMCs operating in the so-called “lethal capability” market generally work with a 
small number of permanent staff, but maintain contact with personnel who can be called 
upon for different contracts. Id. at Ch. 2.2.4.  Strategic Consulting International, for 
example, reportedly has maintained a permanent staff of about twelve people, but has or had 
contacts with another 150 or so who could be available for projects as needed. Id. at Ch. 
2.2.3.  Some claim that the PMC Executive Outcomes had a permanent staff of only about 
thirty, but could raise a battalion of 650 men within 15 days. Id.  Only paying for additional 
personnel on an as-needed basis obviously economizes on overhead expenses.   
 12.  To an extent, these trends may cannibalize the west’s militaries, particularly within 
the officer echelons. See Rebecca Weiner, Private Military Contractors Come with Strings 
Attached, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL BELFER CTR. NEWSLETTER (Belford Ctr. for Science 
and Int’l Affairs), Winter 2005-06, at 1, available at http://www.belfercenter.org/ 
publication/private-military-contractors-come-strings-attached [https://perma.cc/WW43-
NJC4].  Lured by reports of cash-salary increases up to 400%, hundreds of soldiers have 
decided not to re-enlist, and instead have entered the private sector. Id.  Fortunately for the 
U.S., government reports also indicate that the increased employment of private military 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, did not appear to have increased attrition 
of military personnel.  Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE REP. 11 (Aug. 2008) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT. OFFICE REP. at 35 
(2005)).
 13.  HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2 (discussing the reasons for PMC 
emergence).
 14.  Weiner, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing PMC employment payment). 
 15.  For perspective, in 2007, private security guards working for companies like 
Blackwater USA and DynCorp International were earning up to $1,222 per day, or about 
$445,000 per year; in contrast, a U.S. Army sergeant earned $140 to $190 per day in pay 
and benefits, or about $51,100 to $69,350 a year.  U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
REP., supra note 12, at 8.  The report explains that the “figure of $1,222 a day represents the 
contractor’s billing rate, not the amount paid to the contractor’s employees.  The billing rate 
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while regular military units are typically maintained in full force 
structure.16
B. Increased instability in regions with hard-power vacuums has 
increased demand for PMCs and PSCs. 
Certain factors likely contributed to PMCs and PSCs appearing on 
governmental and corporate radars.17  One observer notes, “[N]ot 
coincidentally, the rise of these companies . . . coincid[ed] with the 
pullback of western nations18 and the United Nations from peace-keeping 
and peace-enforcing.”19  Also, there appears to be little doubt that PMCs 
populated by many recently-retired military personnel have emerged to fill 
voids when conflicts have erupted after the Cold War.20  Military vacuums 
is greater than an employee’s pay because it includes the contractor’s indirect costs, 
overhead and profit.”  Id. at 14. 
 16.  Id.
 17.  See Strom et al., supra note 3, at § 4.4.5 (“Privatization of military functions has 
also seen an upswing . . .  [A]n estimated 20,000 individuals have been hired as contract 
private military guards in Iraq.  Private military guards may ‘provide logistical support to 
armed forces and also perform protection, training, consulting, and planning services . . . 
[and] some . . . actually engage in combat under contract.’”) (citations omitted). 
 18.  Increased use of PSCs or PMCs is not confined to non-western governments.  In 
Iraq, the U.S. employed 155,000 contractors – or about the same as the number of U.S. 
soldiers there – while toward the end of the Afghanistan campaign, 207,000 contractors 
supported 175,000 soldiers. America’s Paid Boots on the Ground, THE WEEK (Nov. 8, 
2014), http://theweek.com/articles/442453/americas-paid-boots-ground 
[https://perma.cc/8N6E-2DH7].  In 2006, there were an estimated 20,000 contractors 
working for an estimated sixty PMCs in conflicts where western interests were implicated.  
Rebecca Weiner, supra note 12.  Increasingly, PMCs contract to handle core military 
functions, such as combat training, interrogation, operational support and strategic planning.  
Id. And, according to the report of a meeting of PMC industry experts conducted under 
U.N. auspices, there are now a very large number of PMC contractors operating in what has 
become a $100 billion industry.  Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their 
Status Under International Humanitarian Law and its Impact on Their Regulation, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 573, 575 (Sept. 2006) (citing Report of the Third Meeting of Experts on 
traditional new forms of mercenary activity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/23, ¶ 12).  Toward the 
end of 2014, there were some 1,600 military contractors still working for the U.S. in Iraq.  
Id.  The PMC industry now appears to be a significant part of the United States’ combat, 
anti-terror and security landscape.  Steven Schooner, a former White House military 
procurement official who studied contractor policy at George Washington University, 
asserts that Americans need to be aware that their “government has increasingly delegated 
to the private sector the responsibility to stand in harm’s way and, if required, die for 
America.” Id.
 19.  See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2.3 (quoting Herbert Howe, 
Global Order and Security Privatisation, INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES, No. 140 
(May 1998)). 
 20.  See David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and the U.S. Grand Strategy,
INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. (“PRIO”), Jan. 2009, at 5 (describing how the military 
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in areas of conflict have contributed to demand for PMCs on the part of 
governments formerly supported by super-powers; these governments want 
continued military assistance in the absence of superpower or U.N. 
support.21
In addition, the elimination of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, efforts to 
restrain or topple or undermine the Assad regime in Syria while 
concurrently containing and defeating ISIS, and other disturbances to prior 
governmental orders in the region, together with “hard-power” vacuums, 
have caused long-suppressed ethnic, political, or religious rivalries in the 
Middle East to resurface.  These changes have led to a number of intra-
state and cross-border conflicts between ethnic or religious groups - 
increasing instability in certain countries and adding urgency to the need to 
protect corporate employees or facilities which may be nearby. 
Also, recent terror attacks in Europe and increased political instability 
in areas of Africa, for example - all at a time when the West may be 
reluctant to increase commitments of their own militaries or peace-keeping 
personnel22 - have also likely fueled demand for private security 
companies’ services. 
C. The industry and observers have spoken to a number of concerns.
Concerns Encountered; Responsive Viewpoints 
Corporations considering engaging a PSC or PMC are likely to 
encounter questions of whether these firms employ adequately trained and 
disciplined individuals.  These concerns can result, for example, from the 
U.S. government’s use of the firms involved in misconduct or incidents like 
the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib23 or the shootings at Nisour 
Square in Iraq. 
Despite well-publicized negative incidents, others contend that PSCs 
are the future of international corporate security.  Some predict that PMCs 
may also become the future of United Nations or other joint peace-keeping 
efforts.24  Still others assert that PSCs perform necessary services that in-
house corporate security staff are incapable of performing, and that PMCs 
provide military or support functions that the U.N., as well as foreign 
continually turned more to private contractors as the Cold War concluded). 
 21.  See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.1 (explaining how losing 
superpower’s support had led to the expanding role of PMCs in certain nations). 
 22.  Id. (discussing the increase in PMC services).   
 23.  Cameron, supra note 18.
 24.  See id. at 598 (citing, among others, Max Boot, Darfur Solution: Send in the 
Mercenaries, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at B13, and Kristen Fricchione, The Casualties in 
Evolving Warfare: Impact of Private Military Firms’ Proliferation on the International 
Community, 23 WISC. INT’L L.J. (Fall 2005)). 
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governments which aspire to become more democratic, are unable to 
provide.  In some cases, critics of U.N. peacekeeping forces have even 
called for private security firms to take over command from those forces.25
The positive experiences of certain governments with well-trained 
PMCs appear to have improved private-sector opportunities for PSCs.26
Even in contexts arguably resembling adventurism, PMCs have informed 
advocates.
In 1995, for example, the political and investment climate in the west-
African region near Sierra Leone was very unstable.  In a closely-observed 
move, that country’s government (with financing provided, in part, by the 
International Monetary Fund) engaged a PMC to help force Liberian-
backed rebel forces out of the country.  Once Sierra Leone terminated this 
engagement, the violence promptly returned.27  Observers state that only 
after a British-led military intervention stiffened a floundering U.N. 
peacekeeping mission28 did the country stabilize to the point that major 
companies again considered investing in the affected region. 
Dr. Christopher Spearin of the Canadian Forces College Department 
of Defence Studies has noted that, in Sierra Leone, the host nation’s 
military stated that PMCs “did a positive job . . . [W]e did not consider 
them mercenaries but as people bringing in some sanity” to an otherwise 
untenable and violent environment.29
Other advocates argue that PMCs can have more practical impact – 
and can be more cost-efficient - than U.N.-sponsored security forces 
assigned to unstable regions.  One authority laments: 
With a depressing dearth of nations volunteering to send more 
competent troops, the U.N. is forced to rely on . . . inept 
militaries to do their peace keeping and peace enforcement. . . 
[A]s a result, the U.N. is often left with world’s least competent 
soldiers to do the world’s most difficult peace missions, almost 
ensuring failures and setbacks such as Angola . . . [,] Sierra 
 25.  Isenberg, supra note 20. 
 26.  CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE
RISE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 10 (2006) (stating that “[e]ven though private 
military and security companies are relatively new to international security, they are 
increasingly being recognized by governments, civil societies and international 
organizations as legitimate actors that can have a positive impact on international security”) 
(emphasis added).
 27. Simon Akam, The Vagabond King, NEW STATESMAN 4 (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.newstatesman.com/africa/2012/01/sierra-leone-strasser-war 
[https://perma.cc/PU3G-FK6L]. 
 28.  Id. at 5. 
 29.  HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2.5. 
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Leone[, and other unstable areas.]30
House of Commons’ minutes observe that, as of August 2002, the 
operations that the U.N. undertook in Sierra Leone after PMC engagements 
were terminated cost over a half a billion dollars – and many would 
question whether the results were worth a fraction of that amount.31
In contrasting these U.N. peacekeeping or policing efforts with PMC 
engagements, Tim Spicer, a founder of Aegis Defence Services, noted that 
“UN involvement in Angola cost $1 million a day – $365 million a year – 
and achieved absolutely nothing,” while “Executive Outcomes charged the 
Angola government $80 million for two years and got Unita to the 
conference table, putting an end to the war in a couple of months.”32
For these and other reasons, PMC engagements have increased 
significantly since the late 1980’s.33  PMCs were employed in Desert Storm 
in 1991, in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, and subsequently in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan.34  PMCs have been engaged in approximately 80 conflicts in 
the decade from 1990 to 2000 alone.35
D. As engaging PMCs becomes more acceptable for governments, 
PSCs have become a more common option in the private sector. 
In part because PMCs have achieved positive results for certain 
governmental clients – while simultaneously avoiding too many 
controversies – western governments have appeared more receptive to 
engaging PMCs. 
The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, contracted with Aegis 
Defence Services to provide security support services to the Project and 
Contracting Office, which was responsible for managing reconstruction 
programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and also to provide security for the Oil-
for-Food inquiry.36  Also, in May 2011, it was announced that the U.S. 
military would pull out of Baghdad and be replaced by eight PMCs and 
PSCs which would take over security operations.37  Aegis Defence Services 
 30.  Id. at Ch. 2.4.
 31.  Id.
 32.  Id. (quoting LT. COL. C. SPICER OBE, AN UNORTHODOX SOLDIER (Mainstream 
Publ’g 1999)). 
 33.  Isenberg, supra note 20, at 12. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id. at 13. 
 36.  See generally Aegis Defence Services, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_Defence_Services [https://perma.cc/L4UA-QW4C] 
(last modified Dec. 10, 2016, 10:49 PM) (describing the nature of Aegis Defence Services’ 
offerings).
 37.  Id.
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also received a contract from the U.S. Department of State to provide 
security at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.38
A private corporation’s contracting with a PSC may draw less public 
scrutiny than, for example, the U.S. Department of State’s or an African 
host government’s employing a PMC.  But it seems apparent that, as 
contracting with PMCs has become more common among governments, 
contracting with PSCs has similarly become more common for private 
companies. 
For example, some have publicly called for shipping companies to 
engage PSCs to help protect crew members, vessels and cargoes in pirate-
plagued waters off the east coast of Somalia, as “everyone recognizes that 
the regular naval ships are not going to stay there.”39  If ship-owners need 
to increase security onboard their ships by arming someone, the argument 
goes, it would be better to rely on trained professional contractors than to 
simply give arms to inexperienced crew members.40
The situation has progressed to the point that the website for the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq (to give one example) provides a list of PSCs 
available to companies or persons doing business in that country.41  The 
website is careful to note the list does not constitute an endorsement by the 
U.S. government.42  Nevertheless, the listing gives the impression that the 
U.S. Embassy is aware that private corporations may need the services of a 
PSC in the country, and that, depending on circumstances, engaging a PSC 
is not frowned upon by the U.S. government. 
II. LEGAL ACTIONS
Certain PSC employees working in unstable areas are often armed.  
And the types of environments necessitating engagement of a PSC in the 
first instance are often those where the potential for conflict exists.  Given 
the potential for conflict which causes PSCs to be hired in the first instance, 
and given that types of protective services that PSCs are expected to 
provide, clients should not be surprised if incidents involving the use of 
force sometimes occur. 
Rightly or wrongly, the United States are viewed as a litigious society.  
When incidents involving PSCs occur, affected locals – whether genuinely 
 38.  Id.
 39.  David Isenberg, Pirates, PSCs and Lawyers, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 27, 
2010, 12:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/pirates-psc-and-lawyers_ 
b_592036.html [https://perma.cc/RRP4-4LU5].  
 40.  Id.
 41.  See EMBASSY OF THE U.S., supra note 9 (listing available PSC companies).   
 42.  See id. (stating that the “U.S. government assumes no responsibility for the 
professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms whose names appear on the list”) 
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wronged or merely opportunistic – may bring action in the U.S. with the 
view that this country has an accessible, transparent and, at times, generous 
legal system. 
Generally speaking, legal actions implicating PSCs result from claims 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) or claims under state tort 
law.  In addition, some plaintiffs raise claims under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (“TVPA”).  The following discussion addresses some of the 
principal issues PSC clients can encounter in addressing these claims. 
A. Alien Tort Statute 
The Alien Tort Statute is a federal statute, first enacted in 1789, 
providing that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”43  The ATS, however, “is a 
jurisdictional statute” only, and creates “no new causes of action.”44  The 
plain language of the ATS states it will not confer jurisdiction for claims 
unless the plaintiff is “an alien . . . suing for a tort committed in violation of 
international law.”45
ATS claims have three elements: (1) the plaintiff must be an alien, (2) 
suing for a tort, (3) which has been committed in violation of international 
law.46  Generally, the cases suggest that an “alien” within the meaning of 
the ATS means a non-U.S. citizen.47
1. Jurisdictional Prerequisites 
Before reaching the merits of an alien’s international law tort claim, 
courts must be satisfied that the jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied. 48
 43.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015). 
 44.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
 45.  Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 46.  See, e.g., Balaco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 
2011) (providing the basic elements of an ATS tort claim). 
 47.   See, e.g., Sai v. Clinton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting potential need 
to “conclude that Plaintiff is an alien capable of bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute 
rather than a U.S. citizen”), aff’d, No. 11-5142, 2011 WL 4917030 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2011); 
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that an ATS claim failed 
as a result of the putative plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship). 
 48.  Generally, courts hold that the ATS imposes no requirement that a plaintiff first 
exhaust his or her remedies in the foreign jurisdiction where the alleged wrong occurred.  
See, e.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part, dism’d
in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.  Courts, however, have 
recognized that, while the ATS contains no rigid exhaustion requirement, 
a U.S. Court might, as a matter of international comity, stay an Alien Tort suit 
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Decisions addressing these jurisdictional requisites constitute much of ATS 
case law. 
The cases indicate that courts must assure themselves that: (1) the 
complaint pleads a violation of the law of nations, (2) the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of the ATS, announced by the Supreme 
Court in Kiobel II,49 does not bar the claim, (3) customary international 
law, or the body of law recognized as the “law of nations,” recognizes the 
asserted liability of the defendant, and (4) the theory of liability alleged by 
plaintiffs, for example, aiding and abetting or conspiracy, is also 
recognized by customary international law.50  Defects in any of these 
jurisdictional requirements will be fatal to the plaintiff’s claims, but courts 
have discretion as to the order and manner of considering jurisdictional 
prerequisites.51
Also, depending on the circuit, the ATS may not confer jurisdiction 
where the defendant is a corporation.52
a. A Hurdle: Pleading a Violation of the Law of Nations - the 
Alleged Misconduct Must be Severe 
In the typical case involving a corporation’s engaging a PSC or PMC, 
the non-U.S. citizen will bring action under the ATS against both the PSC 
and its corporate client seeking compensation for torts based on a violation 
of “international law” or the law of nations.53
Though the ATS was part of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme 
Court did not directly address the statute until a 2004 decision, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain.54  Noting reasons for “great caution in adapting the law 
of nations to private rights,”55 the Court observed that the Act contemplates 
that “district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain 
torts in violation of the law of nations” based on “‘specific, universal, and 
that had been filed in the U.S. Court, in order to give the courts of the nation in 
which the violation had occurred a chance to remedy it, provided that the nation 
seemed willing and able to do that. 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
 49.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 50.  Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 51.  Id.
 52.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on 
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69 (U.S. 2013). 
 53.  See KRISTINE A. HUSKEY, THE AMERICAN WAY: PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
& U.S. LAW AFTER 9/11, AN UPDATE – 2010 34 (Priv-War Report Nat’l Report Series 3/10, 
Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184090 [https://perma.cc/E35C-
PEMS].
 54.  542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004). 
 55.  Id. at 728 (citation omitted). 
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obligatory’” international law norms.56
Sosa is interpreted to mean that, to be actionable under the ATS, the 
alleged misconduct supporting jurisdiction must be severe.  An appropriate 
ATS defendant is “an enemy of all mankind” (and consequently, an enemy 
of most sovereigns) who has engaged in one of the “handful of heinous 
actions. . . which violate definable, universal and obligatory norms.”57  For 
example, appropriate ATS defendants include, “‘the torturer . . . the pirate 
and slave trader.’”58
Consistent with this “high bar,”59 the Court found that a short-term, 
allegedly “arbitrary” detention was not a violation of a “norm of customary 
international law so well defined as to support” an ATS claim.60
Specifically, “a single illegal detention of [a Mexican national] of less than 
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a 
prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so 
well defined as to support [a] federal remedy.”61
More severe misconduct also may not suffice.  For example, murder 
of one private party by another, universally proscribed by the domestic law 
of all countries (subject to varying definitions), is not actionable under the 
ATS as a violation of customary international law because the “nations of 
the world” have not demonstrated that this wrong is “of mutual, and not 
merely several, concern.”62
Lower federal courts continue to parse through the misconduct rising 
to the level of violating “specific, universal and obligatory” norms.  
Generally speaking, to be actionable under the ATS, the misconduct must 
be extreme, for example, torture or something equivalently reprehensible, 
as opposed to arbitrary detentions without cause, racial or religious 
discrimination by private parties or entities, exposure of individuals to 
chemical hazards, etc.63
 56.  Id. at 725, 732. 
 57.  Id. at 732 (citation omitted). 
 58.  Id. (citation omitted).
 59.  Id. at 727. 
 60.  Id. at 736, 738. 
 61.  Id. at 738. 
 62.  Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003).
 63.  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that 
“torture [is] . . . prohibited by law of nations.”).  Cf. Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “detention without being informed of the availability of 
consular notification and access” is not a “tort in violation of customary international law 
cognizable under the ATS”); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. 
Co., 517 F.3d 104, 117-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting a “lack of consensus in international 
community on whether proscription on poison” would apply to use of herbicide that harmed 
people when “[p]laintiffs nowhere allege that the government intended to harm human 
beings through its use of Agent Orange”); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 293 F.3d 440, 448 (2d 
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Practitioners should be aware that courts (and litigants) still wrestle 
with a precise definition of misconduct violating international law, given 
that law’s “soft, indeterminate character.”64
b. The presumption against extra-territorial application bars 
many claims. 
A significant jurisdictional hurdle for ATS claims is also found in the 
presumption against extra-territorial application. 
In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court addressed whether an ATS “claim 
may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”65  In 
Kiobel II, Nigerian petitioners who became U.S. residents filed claims 
under the ATS against Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations based on 
events that occurred in Nigeria.66  These corporations had only attenuated 
contacts with United States – for example, their shares traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange and an affiliated investor-relations office existed in 
New York City.67  The Supreme Court determined the ATS claims were 
barred, holding that “the presumption against extra-territoriality applies to 
claims under the ATS, and nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”68
The Supreme Court noted alongside its holding that “all the relevant 
conduct took place outside the United States.”69  Though the Court did not 
hold that plaintiffs may never bring ATS claims based upon extra-territorial 
conduct, it made clear that, to be viable, such claims must “touch and 
concern the territory of the United States” and “must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extra territorial application.”70
Because Kiobel II was a so-called “‘foreign-cubed’ case”– a foreign 
plaintiff suing a foreign defendant where the relevant conduct occurred on 
foreign soil – the events therein neither touched nor concerned U.S. 
territory with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extra-
territorial application.71
Cir. 2000) (stating when committed by private actor, “neither racial nor religious 
discrimination” is a violation of the law of nations; but “war crimes and genocide are 
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act” when committed by private actor). 
 64.  Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted); see id. at 1016 (“[S]ome of the most widely accepted international 
norms are vague, such as ‘genocide’ and ‘torture.’”). 
 65.  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (U.S. 2013). 
 66.  Id. at 1662-63.
 67.  Id. at 1677-78 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 68.  Id. at 1669. 
 69.  Id.
 70.  Id.
 71. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 585 (11th Cir. 2015).
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The court in Kiobel II did not fully explain its “touch and concern” 
language, nor did it precisely define “sufficient force” or “relevant 
conduct.”72  The Court also did not address what constitutes more than a
“mere corporate presence” in the U.S. sufficing to permit jurisdiction.73
Courts continue to work through these issues. 
i. Second Circuit – Two Prongs 
The Second Circuit in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp. determined that 
“domestic contacts” are at the heart of Kiobel’s touch-and-concern inquiry, 
observing that “evaluation of the presumption’s application to a particular 
case is essentially an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are 
sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all.”74  Examining the 
complaint, the Mastafa court found allegations only of “some ‘contact’ 
between the injuries alleged [which occurred extraterritorially] and the 
territory of the United States.”75  Thus, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was triggered, but not “self-evidently dispositive”; further 
jurisdictional inquiry was needed.76
The Second Circuit then relied on Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,77
an earlier Supreme Court case applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act.78  In 
Morrison, the Court set forth the “focus” test, which requires courts to 
determine whether “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern,” or the conduct 
“that the statute seeks to ‘regulate,’” occurred in the territory of the United 
States.79
Applying this focus test, the Second Circuit found that the focus of 
jurisdictional inquiries under the ATS should be on “the conduct alleged to 
violate the law of nations, and the location of that conduct.”80  In Mastafa,
this was conduct “alleged to aid and abet the violation.”81  The court in 
Mastafa determined that to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the complaint must plead two prongs: 
(1) conduct of the defendant that “touch[es] and concern[s]” the 
 72.  See Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (holding that the presumption against extra-
territoriality applies to ATS claims). 
 73.  Id.
 74. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 75.  Id. at 182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  Id. at 183. 
 77.  Id. (citing 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
 78.  561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 79.  Id. at 266-67. 
 80.  Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185 (emphasis added). 
 81.  Id. at 185, 195. 
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United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, and (2) that the same conduct, upon 
preliminary examination, states a claim for a violation of the law 
of nations or aiding and abetting another’s violation of the law of 
nations.82
Thus, the inquiry depended on “alleged conduct by anyone — U.S. 
citizen or not — that took place in the United States and aided and abetted 
a violation of the law of nations.”83
The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs had “alleged specific, 
domestic conduct,” including the defendants’ oil-purchase transactions and 
financing oil transactions, from within the United States and the facilitation 
of illicit payments and financing arrangements through a U.S.-based bank 
account.84  Given these specific and non-conclusory allegations of domestic 
conduct, the Mastafa court found that the plaintiffs’ claims appeared to 
touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption and satisfy the “first prong” of the court’s jurisdictional 
analysis.85
Though domestic conduct displaced the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the plaintiffs’ claims nonetheless failed the second prong 
of the court’s jurisdictional inquiry. Specifically, plaintiffs failed to 
plausibly plead that the defendants’ aiding and abetting of the international 
law violations met the mens rea standard of the Second Circuit.86
Sufficient pleading would require a plaintiff to plausibly allege that 
defendants acted with the purpose or intent “to aid and abet violations of 
customary international law.”87  While the plaintiffs’ complaint appeared to 
allege something akin to purpose, it did so only in conclusory terms.88
Consequently, the Mastafa court concluded it could not exercise 
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.89
ii. Fourth Circuit – Weight of U.S.-Related Facts Giving 
Rise to the Claim 
In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc., an action against a military 
contractor, the Fourth Circuit noted that Kiobel II “broadly stated that the 
 82.  Id. at 187. 
 83.  Id. at 189. 
 84.  Id. at 195. 
 85.  Id.
 86.  See id. at 193-96 (stating that allegations of the requisite mens rea standard were 
made only in “conclusory terms”).
 87.  Id. at 193. 
 88.  Id. at 194. 
 89.  Id. at 195-96. 
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‘claims,’ rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern 
United States territory with sufficient force.”90  The Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that the Supreme Court’s language instructs lower courts to “apply a fact-
based analysis” and that “courts should not assume that the presumption 
categorically bars cases that manifest a close connection to United States 
territory.”91  Rather, courts should “consider all the facts that give rise to 
ATS claims, including the parties’ identities and their relationship to the 
causes of action.”92
Applying this fact-based analysis, the Fourth Circuit found several 
factors relevant (and, together, dispositive) including (1) the defendant’s 
status as a U.S. corporation, (2) the U.S. citizenship of defendant’s 
employees who allegedly committed acts of torture, (3) the U.S. 
connections arising from the defendant corporation’s and its employees’ 
contracting with, and obtaining security clearances from, the U.S. 
government,93 (4) the allegations that defendant aided and abetted torture 
through conduct that took place within the United States, for example, 
corporate managers located in the United States becoming aware of reports 
of misconduct, seeking to “cover up” misconduct, and “implicitly, if not 
expressly, encourag[ing] it,”94 and (5) “the expressed intent of Congress, 
through enactment of the TVPA and 18 U.S.C. § 2340A to provide aliens 
access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States 
accountable for acts of torture committed abroad.”95
Weighing all of these factors, the Al Shimari court held that the 
plaintiffs’ claims touched and concerned the territory of the United States 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of the ATS, so that the ATS conferred jurisdiction on the 
district court.96
iii. Ninth Circuit – Concrete Conduct in the U.S. Relevant 
to the Wrongdoing 
In Mujica v. AirScan Inc., plaintiffs sued AirScan Inc., a Florida-based 
 90.  758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669). 
 91.  Id. at 527-28 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009)) (establishing 
that a “claim” is the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a 
court”); see also id. at 528 (articulating that “it is not sufficient merely to say that because 
the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United States 
territory”).
 92.  Id. at 527. 
 93.  Id. at 530-31. 
 94.  Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95.  Id.
 96.  Id.
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private security firm, and its energy-sector client Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. (“Occidental”) after deaths and injuries occurred during an air 
bombing in Santo Domingo, Colombia.97  Plaintiffs alleged that AirScan 
provided security for Occidental against pipeline attacks by leftist 
insurgents in Colombia, and that defendants had worked with the 
Colombian military to provide it with financial and other assistance to 
further Occidental’s commercial interests.98  Plaintiffs also alleged that 
Occidental provided AirScan and the Colombian military with a room in its 
Colombian offices for planning an air raid on the Santo Domingo 
location.99
According to plaintiffs, AirScan and the Colombian Air Force 
(“CAF”) conducted the air raid only to protect Occidental’s oil pipeline; the 
raid was not conducted on behalf of the Colombian government.100  Further, 
three AirScan employees and a CAF liaison piloted a plane funded by 
Occidental and bearing CAF markings.  AirScan used the plane to provide 
CAF with aerial surveillance to identify targets and deploy troops on the 
ground.101  A cluster bomb dropped by a CAF helicopter also allegedly 
destroyed homes, killed seventeen civilians and wounded twenty-five 
others; afterwards, CAF troops allegedly ransacked homes in Santo 
Domingo.102
On these facts, the Court in Mujica observed that the “allegations that 
form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims exclusively concern conduct that 
occurred in Colombia.”103  At most, the plaintiffs only “speculate[d] that 
some of [the] conduct . . . could have occurred in the United States.”104
Further, the plaintiffs’ speculation about domestic conduct was found in 
their reply brief, which was filed only after the Kiobel II decision was 
issued.105
The lack of any concrete conduct in the U.S. caused the Ninth Circuit 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.  The Mujica Court reasoned: 
[i]n the absence of . . . allegations of conduct in the United States, 
the only remaining nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims and this 
country is . . . that Defendants are both U.S. corporations.  That 
fact . . . [wa]s not enough to establish that the ATS claims here 
‘touch and concern’ the United States with sufficient force” 
 97.  771 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 98.  Id.
 99.  Id.
 100.  Id.
 101.  Id.
 102.  Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014).
 103.  Id. at 592. 
 104.  Id.
 105.  Id. at 591.
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under Kiobel II.106
While a “defendant’s U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one factor that, 
in conjunction with other factors,” might “establish a sufficient connection 
between an ATS claim and the . . . United States to satisfy Kiobel.”
However, “the Supreme Court has never suggested that a plaintiff can bring 
an action based solely on extraterritorial conduct merely because the
defendant is a U.S. national.”107
Mujica indicates that mere incorporation of a defendant company in a 
U.S. state, or the mere U.S. citizenship of involved individuals - without 
some relevant conduct occurring within the U.S. - will not permit bringing 
an ATS claim.108
iv. Eleventh Circuit – Specific, Reasonably Extensive 
Allegations of Conduct Within the U.S. 
Reviewing both its own case law109 and other precedents in what it 
called a “crowded legal landscape,”110 the Eleventh Circuit in Doe v. 
Drummond Co. described its task as determining whether the ATS applies 
“when aspects of the claims occur both domestically and 
extraterritorially.”111
The Drummond court observed that cases usually fit into one of three 
scenarios.  First, if “no relevant aspects of an ATS claim occur within the 
United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality prevents 
jurisdiction”; second, “if some relevant aspects of the claim occur within 
the United States, we must determine whether the presumption is 
displaced.”112  “In a third scenario wherein all relevant aspects occur within 
the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality would 
obviously not apply — there would be no extraterritorial component to the 
claim.”113
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the second type of scenario before it 
 106.  Id. at 594 (emphasis added). 
 107.  Id.; see also id. at n. 11 (stating that all courts to have addressed the issue, except 
one, have dismissed ATS claims where the only connection to the U.S. was the defendant’s 
U.S. citizenship).  
 108.  Id. at n. 9 (stating that “[w]e do not contend that this factor is irrelevant to the 
Kiobel inquiry; we merely hold that it is not dispositive of that inquiry”). 
 109.  See Doe v. Drummond Co., 278 F.3d 576, 589-592 (11th Cir. 2015) (analyzing 
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Baloco v. 
Drummond Co. (Baloco II), 767 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
 110.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592. 
 111.  Id.
 112.  Id. at n. 23. 
 113.  Id. at 592-593, n. 23. 
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was a “fact-intensive inquiry.”114  Analyzing the facts before it, the court 
also stated the “site of the conduct alleged is relevant and carries significant 
weight.”115  Even when the claim is for secondary responsibility, the court 
determined it must consider the location of underlying conduct, such as 
where the actual injuries were inflicted.116  “Further, the domestic conduct 
alleged must meet a ‘minimum factual predicate’ to warrant the 
extraterritorial application of the ATS.”117  That is, courts must consider 
whether the claims are focused within the United States and “whether the 
plaintiffs have proffered allegations and evidence to the ‘degree necessary’ 
to warrant displacing the presumption.”118
Analyzing these factors, the Drummond court conceded that plaintiffs’ 
claims were brought against U.S. citizens and entities who resided in and 
conducted business within the United States.119  But while the U.S. 
citizenship of the defendants was relevant, that factor was “insufficient to 
permit jurisdiction on its own.”120  Though defendants’ alleged support of a 
“U.S.-designated terrorist organization” was also relevant, this factor 
likewise “[did] not strike with ‘sufficient force’ to displace the presumption 
and permit jurisdiction.”121  Rather, displacement would be warranted only 
“if enough relevant conduct occurred within the United States.”122
In Drummond, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants aided, abetted 
and conspired with the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia (“AUC”) from within the United States, resulting in war crimes 
and the extrajudicial killing of plaintiffs’ decedents in Colombia.123  The 
Court noted that the “domestic or extraterritorial location of all conduct in 
support of those claims is relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.”124  Hence, 
the extraterritorial deaths of plaintiffs’ family members was relevant to 
plaintiffs’ claims that the AUC’s killing of their family members 
constituted extrajudicial killings or war crimes violating international 
law.125  However, plaintiffs also alleged relevant domestic conduct on the 
part of defendants, for example, that defendants’ actions within the United 
States — such as making decisions to engage with the AUC, and agreeing 
 114.  Id. at 592. 
 115.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592. 
 116.  Id. at 593. 
 117.  Id.
 118.  Id.
 119.  Id. at 595. 
 120.  Id. at 596. 
 121.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 597 (citation omitted). 
 122.  Id.
 123.  Id. at 598. 
 124.  Id.
 125.  Id.
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to fund the AUC — aided and abetted the AUC.126
The Drummond court ultimately concluded that plaintiffs’ claims did 
not allege sufficient domestic conduct to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.127  Plaintiffs alleged generally that defendants made 
funding and policy decisions in the United States.128  But plaintiffs also 
alleged specifically that agreements between defendants and the 
perpetrators of the killings, the planning and execution of the extrajudicial 
killings and war crimes, the collaboration by defendants’ employees with 
the AUC, and the actual funding of the AUC, all took place in Colombia.129
In light of Eleventh Circuit precedent, the domestic location of some 
decision-making did not outweigh the extraterritorial location of the rest of 
Plaintiffs’ claims.130
Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of domestic conduct and connections 
were not extensive or specific.131  For example, plaintiffs generally alleged 
that an employee of a defendant obtained consent within the United States 
to provide substantial financial and material support to the AUC.132  These 
were the same types of allegations that the Eleventh Circuit had already 
rejected as insufficient.133
The Drummond court determined that the U.S. citizenship and 
corporate status of defendants, the U.S. interests implicated by plaintiffs’ 
claims, and the U.S.-based conduct were all relevant in determining 
whether plaintiffs’ claims had a U.S. focus and touched and concerned the 
territory of the United States.134  But on the facts presented, those factors 
were insufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.135
 126.  Id.
 127. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 598. 
 128.  Id.
 129.  Id.
 130.  Id.
 131.  Id.
 132.  Id. at 599. 
 133.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 599 (citing Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229 (11th 
Cir. 2014)). 
 134.  Id. at 600. 
 135.  Id.
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c. Does international law recognize the asserted liability of the 
defendants? 
i. State actor vs. non-state actor distinction: non-state 
actors can be liable for genocide and war crimes, 
but not necessarily for summary execution and 
torture.
Whether an ATS action may be brought against a private person or 
corporation, as contrasted to governments or governmental agents or 
officials, is another question that courts continue to address with varying 
results.  Some jurists note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa
“repeatedly emphasizes the need for restraint in extending liability to a 
defendant who is ‘a private actor such as a corporation or individual.’”136
And in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the D.C. Circuit indicated that 
plaintiffs’ ATS claim was barred because there was no consensus on 
whether international law applied to torture committed by private, or non-
state, actors.137
In Kadic v. Karadzic, however, the Second Circuit held that 
international law’s prohibition on genocide and war crimes applied 
regardless of whether the defendant, arguably a private individual, acted on 
behalf of a recognized state.138  While the defendant was not an official of a 
recognized government, he was the self-proclaimed president of the 
unrecognized Bosnian-Serb Republic in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region, 
 136.  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, n. 20 (2004)). 
 137.  Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is worthwhile to consider . . . whether torture today is among the handful 
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility.  Definitions of 
torture set out in international documents suggest it is not. . . .  I decline to read section 1350 
to cover torture by non-state actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court on the 
statute’s use of the term ‘law of nations.’”); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 
1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“insufficient consensus . . . that torture by private actors 
violates international law.”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting 
that rule of Tel-Oren and Sanchez-Espinosa v. Regan, another case holding ATS provides 
no cause of action against private actors, both survive the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sosa).
 138.  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Appellants’ allegations that 
Karadzic personally planned and ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation, 
and other forms of torture designed to destroy . . . groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats clearly state a violation of the international law norm proscribing genocide, 
regardless of whether Karadzic acted under color of law or as a private individual.”); id. at
243 (“all ‘parties’ to a conflict – which includes insurgent military groups – are obliged to 
adhere to the most fundamental requirements of the law of war . . . . The liability of private 
individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized since World War I.”).  
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and had command authority over the military forces who allegedly 
committed systematic rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation and 
torture.139
Kadic further indicated that—while private individuals can be liable 
under the ATS for genocide140 and war crimes as defined by the Geneva 
Convention141 - they may not necessarily be liable for torture or summary 
execution unless committed as part of the genocide or war crimes.142
ii. Majority view: Corporations can be liable, but as the 
result of varying theories. 
 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”), the Second 
Circuit clearly stated that “imposing liability on corporations,” as opposed 
to natural persons, 
for violations of customary international law has not attained a 
discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the 
world . . . . [B]ecause corporate liability is not recognized as a 
‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ norm . . . it is not a rule that 
customary international law that we may apply under the ATS.143
The Second Circuit concluded, “[I]nsofar as plaintiffs in this action 
seek to hold only corporations liable for their conduct in Nigeria . . . under 
the ATS, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”144
In a subsequent case, however, the D.C. Circuit in Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp. determined that corporations can be liable for torts committed by 
their agents and noted it would create a “bizarre anomaly [in tort law] to 
immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their agents in 
lawsuits brought for ‘shockingly egregious violations of universally 
recognized principles of international law.’”145  The court later vacated Doe
 139.  Id. at 237 (discussing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction).  
 140.  See, e.g., The Geneva Convention on Genocide arts. II, IV, Dec. 9 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277 (indicating what constitutes genocide as well as providing associated rules); 
see also Geneva Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 19 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988) 
(providing a bill to implement the International Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide). 
 141.  70 F.3d at 243. 
 142.  Id. (“torture and summary execution – when not perpetrated in the course of 
genocide or war crimes – are proscribed by international law only when committed by state 
officials or under color of law.”). 
 143.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
added), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69 (2013). 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other 
grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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on other grounds, however.146
More recently, in In re Arab Bank PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., the
Second Circuit affirmed the Kiobel I view despite acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court may have suggested otherwise, and despite also 
acknowledging that the Second Circuit appears isolated in its position: 
We conclude that Kiobel I is and remains the law of this Circuit, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II147
 affirming this Court’s judgment on other grounds. . . . [O]ur view 
[is] that Kiobel II suggests that the ATS may allow for corporate 
liability and our observation that there is a growing consensus 
among our sister circuits to that effect.  Indeed, on the issue of 
corporate liability under the ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim 
alone against the tide.148
In contrast to Kiobel I, the Seventh Circuit has determined that 
“corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute” but also noted 
that “plaintiffs concede[d] that corporate liability for . . . violations [of 
customary international law] is limited to cases in which the violations are 
directed, encouraged, or condoned at the corporate defendant’s decision-
making level.”149
The Ninth Circuit has adopted what it calls a “norm-by-norm analysis 
of corporate liability” under the ATS.150  Under this approach, “for each 
ATS claim asserted by the plaintiffs, a court should look to international 
law and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms 
underlying that claim.”151  For example, the Ninth Circuit had previously 
determined that the “norm against genocide and the norm against war 
crimes” apply to “states, individuals and groups.”152  Further, these “norms 
were ‘universal’ or applicable to ‘all actors,’ and, consequently, applicable 
to corporations.”153
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed three 
principles it had previously articulated.154  First, “the analysis proceeds 
norm-by-norm; there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or 
 146.  527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
 147.  Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 148.  In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jesner 
v. Arab Bank PLC, No, 16-499, 2017 WL 1199472 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 149.  Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 150.  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 151.  Id. (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on 
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013)). 
 152.  Id.
 153.  Id.
 154.  Id. at 122. 
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liability.”155  Second, “corporate liability under the ATS does not depend on 
the existence of international precedent enforcing legal norms against 
corporations.”156  Third, “norms that are ‘universal and absolute’ or 
applicable to ‘all actors’ can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a 
corporation.”157  For example, “the prohibition against slavery is universal 
and may be asserted against . . . corporate defendants.”158
Like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit – without 
much elaboration – has held that corporations can be liable under the 
ATS.159
d. Does international law recognize the plaintiff’s theory of 
liability?
This jurisdictional prerequisite can be significant for clients or client 
corporations of PSCs or PMCs.  The client usually is not alleged to have 
directly engaged in acts so heinous as to violate definable, universal and 
obligatory norms, nor to have directly committed misconduct like torture,
piracy or slave trading.  More typically, the allegations are that the client 
aided or abetted the violation of international law, or conspired with others 
to violate that law, giving rise to secondary or accessorial liability. 
i. Aiding and abetting liability requires a mens rea of
purpose or intent and an actus reus of knowing 
practical assistance with a substantial effect. 
For aiding and abetting claims, customary international law, as 
opposed domestic law, provides the legal standard for what constitutes 
aiding and abetting ATS claims.160  Under this standard, circuit courts have 
generally held that the mens rea required for aiding and abetting or 
 155.  Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 747-48). 
 156.  Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760-61). 
 157.  Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760). 
 158.  Id.
 159.  Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); see also In re
South African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that 
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held that corporations can be liable under 
the ATS, describing Kiobel I opinion as a “stark outlier” and finding that corporations can 
be liable under the ATS despite Kiobel I).
 160.  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 
2009) (stating “[w]e agree that Sosa and our precedents send us to international law to find 
the standard for accessorial liability”); see also, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254, 276 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the mens rea statute in 
Rome for accomplice liability is typical of others internationally). 
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conspiracy liability is purpose or intent rather than mere knowledge.161
Specifically, the defendant must have the “purpose of facilitating the 
[alleged violation]”162 or the “purpose or intent to facilitate the commission 
of the specific offenses alleged.”163  This “demanding pleading standard” is 
satisfied with “detailed factual allegations.”164
The actus reus required for aiding and abetting is usually phrased as 
“‘knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration’” of the wrong.165  The assistance need not 
constitute an “indispensable element” of the wrong; rather, a plaintiff must 
show that the wrong “most probably would not have occurred in the same 
way had not someone acted in the role the accused in fact assumed.”166
Merely “supplying a violator of the law of nations with funds” as part 
of a commercial transaction, without more, cannot constitute aiding and 
abetting a violation of international law.167  But allegations that a corporate 
defendant “facilitated arms shipments” used in “carrying out attacks” and 
paid the organization alleged to be carrying out the attacks “every month 
for approximately seven years,” on the other hand, sufficed to allege 
substantial assistance and actus reus.168
ii. Conspiracy liability is less settled. 
Conspiracy liability under the ATS is less settled.  Some courts 
 161.  Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259 (“hold[ing] that the mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge 
alone.”); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (“agree[ing] with the 
Second Circuit that a purpose standard alone has gained ‘the requisite acceptance among 
civilized nations for application under the ATS.’”) (citation omitted); see also Doe v. 
Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-01041, 2010 WL 9450019 at *15 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2010) 
(asserting that “[a] claim of conspiracy under the ATS/TVPA requires the same proof of 
mens rea as aiding and abetting claims – a showing of intent, and not merely knowledge”). 
 162.  Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted) (holding that an “aiding and abetting ATS defendant must act with the 
purpose of facilitating the criminal act”) (emphasis added). 
 163.  In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 
1343 (S.D. Fla.  2011). 
 164.  Id. at 1345, 1347. 
 165.  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 453 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Almog v. 
Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Judgment, 235, Dec. 10, 1998 and explaining the 
standards for enforcing liability on secondary parties for aiding and abetting charges).  
 166.  Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 287; Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 
667 (citation omitted). 
 167.  In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
 168.  Chiquita Brands, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1350. 
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continue to note that whether there is conspiracy liability under the ATS 
remains an open question in their circuit.169  Other circuit courts plainly 
state that conspiracy liability is “cognizable under the ATS.”170
In the district courts, pleading conspiracy entails a predictable set of 
elements, for example, that (1) the corporate defendant or client and a PSC 
agreed to commit a recognized international law violation, (2) the corporate 
defendant or client joined the agreement with the purpose or intent to 
facilitate the commission of the violation, and (3) the PSC committed the 
violation.171  Litigants should be aware that at least one court has held that 
conspiracy liability under the ATS “may only attach where the goal of the 
conspiracy was either to commit genocide or to commit aggressive war.”172
2. Statute of Limitations 
The ATS does not specify a statute of limitations.173  In the absence of 
a limitations period prescribed by the statute, federal courts borrow the 
local state’s limitations period unless “a rule from elsewhere in federal law 
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes.”174
Consistent with this approach, several courts have found that the 
appropriate analogy for an ATS claims’ limitations period is that found in 
the TVPA, which provides a ten-year statute of limitations.175
3. Jurisprudential, or Discretionary, Exhaustion of Remedies 
Generally, courts hold that the ATS imposes no express requirement 
 169.  See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 260 and discussing conspiracy liability in the 
Second Circuit). 
 170.  E.g., Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 597 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the 
precedent in the circuit recognizes the claims under the ATS). 
 171.  Chiquita Brands, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1351. 
 172.  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 453 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664-65 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)
 173.  See, e.g., Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 799 (2d Cir. 
2014) (explaining that no decision has been made by the Second Circuit with respect to the 
statute of limitations and claims under the ATS). 
 174.  Northstar Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 175.  See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that all 
courts that have made a decision regarding the statute of limitations have chosen ten years 
as the limit); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778-79 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the statute 
of limitations is subject to the equitable tolling doctrine); Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (analogizing to similar cases and determining that the ten year statute 
of limitations applies); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(claiming that the nature of the injury requires a charitable statute of limitations period). 
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that a plaintiff first exhaust his remedies in the foreign jurisdiction where 
the alleged wrong occurred.176  But while the ATS contains no rigid 
exhaustion requirement, U.S. courts may as a matter of comity stay or 
dismiss a case without prejudice to allow the country where the alleged 
wrong occurred to address it.177  Though not a prerequisite to subject-matter 
jurisdiction, exhaustion of local remedies appears to have gained traction as 
a factor a court may consider before exercising jurisdiction to determine the 
merits. 
a. A weak U.S. nexus strengthens the case for comity. 
A lack of a significant U.S. “nexus” is an important consideration in 
evaluating whether plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their local 
remedies in accordance with principles of international comity.178  The lack 
of a significant United States nexus to the allegations militates in favor of 
comity.179  Where, for example, the claims involve a foreign corporation’s 
complicity in acts on foreign soil that affected only aliens, the situation 
lacks the traditional bases for exercising the United States’ sovereign 
jurisdiction to prescribe laws, namely nationality, territoriality, and 
domestic effect within the United States.180
The Ninth Circuit in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC accordingly noted that, 
while truly heinous conduct – torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
etc. – may implicate matters of “universal concern,” that jurisdiction may 
exist does not mean that U.S. courts should necessarily exercise it.181  The 
court in Sarei also noted that the basis for exercising civil jurisdiction, such 
as that under the ATS, is not as well-settled as the basis for criminal
jurisdiction.182  The caution advised in Sosa counsels that in ATS cases 
where the nexus to the U.S. is weak, courts should carefully consider the 
question of exhaustion, particularly – though not exclusively – when the 
 176.  See, e.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part,
dism’d in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs need not exhaust 
all remedies to state the claim), and cases cited therein. 
 177.  Courts have stated that: 
[w]hat is true is that a U.S. court might, as a matter of international comity, stay 
an Alien Tort suit that had been filed in the U.S. court, in order to give the 
courts of the nation in which the violation had occurred a chance to remedy it, 
provided that the nation seemed willing and able to do that. 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 178.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 179.  Id.
 180.  Id.
 181.  Id.
 182.  Id.
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claims do not involve matters of “universal concern.”183
b. Burdens in the Exhaustion Inquiry 
Courts considering jurisprudential exhaustion under the ATS have 
determined the defendant bears the burden to plead and justify an 
exhaustion requirement, including the availability of local remedies.184
Once a defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not 
been exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that 
the local remedies were “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 
inadequate, or obviously futile.”185  To “exhaust” requires more than a 
plaintiff initiating suit; the plaintiff must obtain a final decision of the 
highest court in the legal system at issue, or show that the state of local law 
or availability of further remedies would make further appeals futile.186
B. Torture Victims Protection Act 
Even when an ATS claim would be unsuccessful, plaintiffs may be 
able to use the TVPA to proceed with their action.187  In contrast with the 
ATS – which contains a specific jurisdictional grant but creates no causes 
of action – the TVPA provides causes of action but contains no 
jurisdictional grant.188  Federal courts’ jurisdiction to consider TVPA 
claims, where present, is based on the general federal question 
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.189
The TVPA provides an explicit federal law claim, stating that an: 
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture 
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or 
[who] . . . subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing, shall in a 
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal 
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an 
action for wrongful death.190
 183.  Id.
 184.  Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832. 
 185.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 186.  Id.
 187.  Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 601 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 188.  Id.
 189.  Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 190.  28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(a) (2012). 
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1. Differences as Compared to the ATS 
Certain other features further distinguish the TVPA from the ATS. 
a. U.S. citizens may bring TVPA claims. 
First, the TVPA empowers both United States citizens and aliens to 
recover for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.191  Causes of action do 
not accrue solely in favor of aliens. 
b. Express Requirement of State Action 
Second, “[t]here is an express requirement of state action in the 
[TVPA].”192  This requirement entails two sub-parts.193  First, the private 
actor can be held liable only when “there [exists] a symbiotic relationship 
between [that] private actor and the government that involves the torture or 
the killing alleged in the complaint.”194  Second, the plaintiff may prove the 
relationship existed “by presenting evidence of the active participation of a 
single official.”195
In Romero v. Drummond,196 for example, a labor union and relatives 
of deceased union leaders sought to bring action under the TVPA against a 
corporate defendant to recover based on the alleged recruitment, by the 
executives of a U.S. corporation’s Colombian subsidiary, of paramilitary 
forces who allegedly tortured and murdered union leaders.197
The case law in this area is developing.  But in Romero, proof of only 
a “general relationship” between paramilitaries who were accused of 
wrongdoing and the Columbian government’s military or government 
officials – without proof that this relationship involved the wrongs made 
the subject of the complaint – did not show action under color of law.198
Evidence that a government official knew of the wrongs committed – 
without evidence that the government was involved in those wrongs – also 
 191.  Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he TVPA 
extended the [ATS], which had been limited to aliens, to allow citizens of the United States 
to bring suits for torture and extrajudicial killings in United States courts.”). 
 192.  Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316. 
 193.  Id. at 1317. 
 194.  Id. at 1316–17. 
 195.  Romero, 552 F.3d at 1317. 
 196.  Romero was decided before Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 
(2012).
 197.  Romero, 552 F.3d at 1309. 
 198.  See Id. at 1317 (ruling that the relationship between the parties in question must 
involve the subject of the complaint in order for plaintiffs to satisfy their burden). 
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did not show action under color of law.199  Further, showing that a 
corporation was aware that the foreign government sometimes supported 
paramilitaries likewise was not evidence of state action or action under 
color of law.200  In addition, a declaration by an individual that he became a 
government official one year after a meeting with the paramilitary forces 
which allegedly committed the wrongs did not show state action or action 
under color of law.201
Cases like Romero suggest that a TVPA plaintiff’s showing action 
under color of law involving the torture or killing alleged in the complaint 
is a relatively firm requirement for bringing the TVPA cause of action.202
c. An Exhaustion Requirement with Doubts Resolved in Favor 
of Plaintiff 
Unlike the ATS, the TVPA contains a written exhaustion requirement 
stating that a “court shall decline to hear a claim. . . if the claimant has not 
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”203  The question of exhaustion is 
for the court, not the jury.204
At least one case suggests that a failure to exhaust local remedies will 
result in dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.205  Other cases, 
however, suggest that exhaustion of remedies is not jurisdictional.206  What 
may be clear is that exhaustion of remedies is an effective affirmative 
defense, but one where the defendant initially bears the burden of proof.207
 199.  Id.
 200.  Id.
 201.  Id.
 202.  Cf. Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(interpreting Romero to say that there is an express requirement of state action in the 
TVPA). 
 203.  Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1350, § 2(b)). 
 204.  Id.
 205.  See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2003) 
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(b) to say that if local remedies are not exhausted, a 
district court must dismiss the TVPA claim).  
 206.  See, e.g., Rojas Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain, 636 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 
2009) (ruling that TVPA’s exhaustion requirement is “not jurisdictional in the ‘subject-
matter’ sense”); Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003) (citing four cases from other districts in which courts ruled that the TVPA’s 
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional). 
 207.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Jean 
v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 
2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part, dism’d in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that under the TVPA, defendants bear the burden of proving that adequate local 
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The same burden-shifting analysis that is used for the ATS then applies to 
the TVPA’s express exhaustion requirement. 
That is, the defendant bears the burden to plead and justify the 
exhaustion requirement, including the availability of local remedies.208  The 
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the futility of exhaustion, 
but the ultimate burden remains with the defendant.209  In addition, TVPA 
cases appear to suggest that any doubts as to whether plaintiff has shown 
exhaustion of local remedies should be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.210
d. No Liability for Corporations or Other Organizations 
In contrast to a majority view holding that corporations can be liable 
under the ATS, there exists no liability for companies or organizations 
under the TVPA.  In Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., the Supreme Court 
examined the TVPA and held that the term “individual,” as used in the 
statute, “encompasses only natural persons.”211  Thus, the TVPA “does not 
impose liability against organizations.”212
Based on Mohamad, the Ninth Circuit in Mujica affirmed dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against defendants, both the PMC AirScan and its 
client Occidental Petroleum, because defendants were “both corporations 
rather than natural persons.”213
e. Definitions for Actionable Wrongs Forming the Basis of 
Claims 
The TVPA avoids some of the murkiness encountered under the ATS 
in seeking to define, for example, a tort “in violation of international law” 
by providing relatively detailed definitions of the “torture” and 
“extrajudicial killings” actionable under this Act.214
remedies do not exist). 
 208.  See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832 (explaining that the burden-shifting under the ATV, that 
defendants must plead and justify exhaustion of local remedies, is present under the TVPA).
 209.  Id.
 210.  See Jean, 431 F.3d at 782 (citing numerous cases from other circuits holding that 
any disputes concerning the TVPA and exhaustion requirement should be resolved in the 
plaintiff’s favor). 
 211.  Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012). 
 212.  Id.
 213.  Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Cardona v. 
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2014) (observing that 
defendant companies were not natural persons so that the “claims under the TVPA must be 
dismissed”). 
 214.  The TVPA defines torture as: 
(b) Torture. — For the purposes of this Act — 
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f. Extraterritorial application 
Whether a TVPA claim’s being based on extra-territorial conduct may 
limit a federal court’s section 1331 jurisdiction has given rise to some 
judicial analysis.215  Generally, courts have determined that the language of 
the TVPA and its legislative history both show it applies 
extraterritorially.216
(1) the term ‘torture’ means any act, directed against an individual in the 
offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering . . . 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such 
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing 
that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind; and 
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or 
resulting from — 
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or 
suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to 
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(C) the threat of imminent death; or 
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death, 
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind 
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
senses or personality. 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 3(b). 
 The TVPA  defines “extrajudicial killing” as: 
. . . a deliberate killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not 
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out 
under the authority of a foreign nation. 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 3(a).  
The fact that the TVPA and ATS employ different definitions of “torture” and “extrajudicial 
killing” may have concrete consequences.  The difference means “each statute provides a 
means to recover for torture [and extrajudicial killing] as [those] term[s] separately draw [] 
[their] meaning[s] from each statute.”  Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 
(11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
 215.  See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 216.  Id.; see also, e.g., Morrison v. National Austrl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); S. 
Rep. No. 102-249, at 3-5 (1991); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Inc., 746 F.3d 42, 
51 (2d Cir. 2014); H. Rep. No. 102-367 at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85 
(indicating extraterritorial application). 
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g. Knowledge and Active Assistance Required for Secondary 
Liability 
The TVPA contemplates liability against those who did not 
“personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing.”217  Specifically, the 
TVPA permits indirect liability, or aider and abettor liability, for those who 
order, abet or assist a violation.218  One circuit court has interpreted the 
TVPA’s legislative history to mean there is an “expansive view of liability 
under the TVPA” so that “‘responsibility for torture, summary execution, 
or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually 
committed those acts – anyone with higher authority who authorized, 
tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.’”219
Notably, the mens rea standard for this TVPA claim is more lenient 
than under the ATS.  To address indirect liability, courts state that a 
plaintiff must show (by a preponderance of the evidence) the individual’s 
“active participation” in the wrongful act, for example, that the “defendants 
gave knowing substantial assistance to the individuals committing the 
wrongful act.”220  Hence, the standard for secondary liability is described as 
a “knowledge” mens rea and a “substantial assistance” actus reus.221
Ultimately, in Drummond, the court concluded that summary 
judgment for the two individual defendants, corporate officers James Tracy 
and Augusto Jimenez, was proper.222  After adequate time for discovery, 
plaintiffs uncovered no evidence that Tracy or Jimenez had any knowledge 
of an alleged corporate scheme to fund or support the paramilitary group 
which allegedly committed extra-judicial killings and war crimes in the 
course of providing “security” for the U.S. corporation’s mining operations 
in Colombia - much less evidence that they had any part in such a scheme, 
or control over those who allegedly did.223  Also, the district court found 
that there was no evidence that Tracy knew that noncombatants were being 
murdered along the rail lines, and further noted an absence of any evidence 
of Tracy’s knowledge that the paramilitary group was allegedly being paid 
 217.  Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012). 
 218.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 604 (citing Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 
1157-59 (11th Cir. 2005)); see id. at 1157 (“An examination of legislative history shows that 
the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who actually committed the acts, to 
those ordering, abetting or assisting in the violation.”) (citing S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 8-9 
(1991)).
 219.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 607 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 9). 
 220.  Id. at 604. 
 221.  Id. at 608. 
 222.  Id. at 604-05. 
 223.  Drummond, 782 F.3d at 581, 604. 
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by Drummond.224
Similarly, the district court found that plaintiffs had proffered no 
admissible evidence with regard to Jimenez’s knowledge other than general 
awareness of the presence of the paramilitary group near the mining 
operations and the group’s violent methods.225  Consequently, there was no 
evidence of mens rea to adequately impose secondary liability on the 
corporate officers.226
At least one appeals court has acknowledged that TVPA claimants 
may face significant hurdles in bringing suit against individuals employed 
by or working on behalf of a company.227  The Supreme Court has also 
noted obstacles which can make TVPA claims challenging for would-be 
plaintiffs; for example, “[v]ictims may be unable to identify the men and 
women who subjected them to [the violation], all the while knowing the 
organization for whom they work.”228  Real-world plaintiffs may encounter 
such challenges in pursuing their claims, and their allegations may not 
yield sufficient admissible evidence after discovery to sustain their TVPA 
action against the individual defendants.229  Nevertheless, this is the 
legislative scheme in which TVPA plaintiffs must operate.
h. Superior or Command Liability 
Noting that domestic law – rather than international law – should 
typically guide interpreting the TVPA, the court in Drummond also
acknowledged that legislative history makes clear that, at times, courts 
should instead interpret the TVPA per international law.230  Adoption of the 
superior or command responsibility doctrine, the court concluded, is one of 
these instances.231
The command responsibility doctrine has three elements: 
(1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between 
the commander and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the 
commander knew or should have known, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had committed, 
were committing, or planned to commit acts violating of the laws 
of war; and (3) that the commander failed to prevent the 
commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates 
 224.  Id. at 604. 
 225.  Id. at 605. 
 226.  Id. at 604-05. 
 227.  Id. at 611. 
 228. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012). 
 229. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 581, 611. 
 230.  Id. at 609. 
 231.  Id.
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after the commission of the crimes.232
In Drummond, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a civilian superior – 
including a civilian corporate officer – “could feasibly be held liable under 
the doctrine, provided the plaintiffs demonstrated a superior-subordinate 
relationship between the civilian and the perpetrator, averring that the 
civilian was in the requisite position of authority and control.”233  The court 
was also careful to note that the command responsibility doctrine is not 
“broadly available to be used against all defendants under the TVPA”; 
rather, it is available “if the requisite degree of responsibility, authority, 
and control is present to support liability.”234
2. Who may bring a claim for the extrajudicial killing? 
Courts have held that the disjunctive “or” in the TVPA’s language 
should be read as creating two different alternatives treated separately.235
This means that either the “legal representative of the victim” or “a person 
who has shown that he or she could be a claimant in a wrongful death 
action for the victim” can recover damages under the TVPA.236
a. Legal Representatives 
Courts have provided little guidance on who may qualify as the 
victim’s legal representative.  Victims of extrajudicial killings obviously 
cannot bring their own claims.  Whether a person qualifies as the “legal 
representative” of such victim appears to hinge on whether the individual 
bringing the claim is the executor or executrix of the decedent’s estate.237
 232.  Id. (citing Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 
2002)).
 233.  Id. at 610. 
 234.  Id.
 235.  See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 
2011).
 236.  Id.
 237.  The Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 2(a)(2), provides that the 
victim’s “legal representative” or “any person who may be a claimant in an action for 
wrongful death” may recover based on an extrajudicial killing.  Id. In explaining this 
provision, the House of Representatives Committee Report stated that “[c]ourts may look to 
state law for guidance as to which parties would be proper wrongful death claimants.”  H.R. 
256, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991).  The Senate Committee Report elaborated: 
The legislation permits suit by the victim or the victim’s legal representative or 
a beneficiary in a wrongful death action.  The term “legal representative” is 
used only to include situations in which the executor or executrix of the 
decedent’s estate is suing or in which an individual is appearing in court as a 
“friend” of the victim because of that victim’s mental or physical incapacity or 
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b. Choice of law for who is a proper claimant 
At least one court, the Eleventh Circuit in Baloco, has determined that 
(1) “state law should govern the determination of whether a plaintiff is a 
claimant in an action for wrongful death [but (2)] where state law would 
provide no remedy, a court may apply the foreign law that would recognize 
the plaintiff’s claim.”238  The Baloco court noted that the TVPA’s language 
does not indicate whether, in applying the relevant state’s law, a court 
should apply that state’s “whole law,” including any choice-of-law 
principles, or only the state’s “internal law.”239  Ultimately, the Baloco 
court decided it did not need to choose between the “whole law” and the 
internal law of Alabama, the forum state.  Under Colombian law, the 
decedents’ children would be proper wrongful death claimants.240  Thus, 
the fact that Alabama choice-of-law rules would dictate that Colombian 
law applied (making the children proper claimants), while Alabama 
internal law would leave the children with no remedy, was ultimately of no 
moment.
3. Statute of Limitations 
The TVPA includes a ten-year statute of limitations.241
C. Common Law Torts 
Plaintiffs bringing claims under the ATS or claims under the TVPA 
youthful age.  The term “beneficiary in a wrongful death action” is generally 
intended to be limited to those persons recognized as legal claimants in a 
wrongful death action under Anglo–American law.
S.R 249, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991) (footnote omitted).
In a footnote, the Senate Committee Report added: “[w]here application of Anglo–American 
law would result in no remedy whatsoever for an extrajudicial killing, however, application 
of foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation in a wrongful death action is 
appropriate.” Id.  at n. 10 (citation omitted).  As an example, the Report cited In re Air 
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana in which the court allowed a nephew’s claim 
even though Louisiana law provided no remedy.  789 F.2d 1092, 1097–98 (5th Cir. 1986), 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1147, 1170 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other 
grounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989). 
 238.  Baloco ex rel. Tapia, 640 F.3d at 1349. 
 239.  Id.
 240.  See id. at 1349-50 (noting that children are capable of bringing wrongful death 
suits).
 241.  See Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Gandhi, 614 F. App’x 29, 31 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(discussing the ten-year statute of limitations in the TVPA and citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 
27(c), which provides a ten-year statute of limitations). 
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also may allege common law tort claims arising from the same facts.  
Because ATS or TVPA claims present federal question jurisdiction, state 
law claims are typically filed in or removed to federal court based on 
supplemental jurisdiction or pendent jurisdiction.242  These claims can 
include, for example, assault and battery, wrongful death, false arrest, 
wrongful imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence, as well as negligent hiring, training and/or supervision.243
The advantage to a plaintiff of bringing state law tort claims based on 
PSC conduct is that the categories of persons or companies who can be 
sued in common law tort are generally broader than under the ATS or 
TVPA.  Plaintiffs asserting common law torts encounter obstacles 
nonetheless. 
1. State tort laws do not apply to extraterritorial conduct. 
In In re Chiquita Brands Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation, plaintiffs asserted various common law torts under 
the laws of “Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, the District of Columbia, and in 
some cases the law of ‘any other applicable jurisdiction.’”244 The Chiquita 
plaintiffs’ claims included assault and battery, wrongful death, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence, negligent hiring, negligence per se, and loss of consortium.245
The Chiquita court noted that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were 
premised on acts committed by para-militaries against Colombian civilians 
which occurred in Colombia during Colombia’s civil war.246  There were 
no allegations that the alleged conduct had, or intended to have, a 
substantial effect within the states of Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, or within 
the District of Columbia.247  Nor were the state law claims alleged, such as
ordinary tort claims for assault and battery, negligence, wrongful death, 
etc., matters of universal concern recognized by the community of 
nations.248  Accordingly, the court in Chiquita held that the civil tort laws of 
 242.  See e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 308 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Hassen v. Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106, 
2010 WL 9538408 at *7 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (stating that “[i]f the Court has 
personal jurisdiction over Defendants as to Plaintiff’s TVPA cause of action, then the Court 
may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over the state tort causes of action”). 
 243.  See HUSKEY, supra note 53, at 37 (discussing various causes of action under the 
ATS and TVPA). 
 244.  792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011).   
 245.  Id.
 246.  Id.
 247.  Id.
 248.  Id.
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Florida, Ohio, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia did not apply to 
the alleged torts based on extraterritorial conduct, and dismissed those 
claims.249
2. No Basis for Purported Federal Common Law Claims 
Some litigants have sought to bring tort claims like survival and 
wrongful death claims as “federal common law” claims.250  Noting that, 
with few exceptions, there is no general federal common law, courts have 
dismissed these purported claims, stating that there is “no sound basis for 
them.”251
3. Courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign law tort 
claims. 
Given that state and purported federal common law tort claims can 
meet these ends, it is no surprise that other plaintiffs have alleged tort 
claims under the law of the jurisdiction where the alleged wrongdoing 
occurred.  These foreign-law tort claims may also be dismissed when a 
district court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. 
Claims under ATS and TVPA are based on federal statutes, giving rise 
to jurisdiction in federal courts. In exercising jurisdiction over these 
federal claims, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But a district court may also 
“decline supplemental jurisdiction when ‘the claim raises a novel or 
complex issue of state law.’”252  In at least one case, the court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s wrongful death claims, 
finding that the claims presented sufficiently complex issues under foreign 
(i.e. Colombian) law that it would have been difficult for the court to 
correctly apply that law.253
Circuit courts have also affirmed a district court’s discretionary 
decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign state 
law tort claims due to the difficulty inherent in reconciling conflicting 
translations of foreign legal precedents, navigating the complexity of the 
parties’ submissions, and discerning foreign law requisites for wrongful 
 249.  Id. at 1317. 
 250.  See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(dismissing claims because they were based on federal common law). 
 251.  Id. at 294. 
 252.  Doe v. Drummond Co., 278 F.3d 576, 611 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) 
(discussing when a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction). 
 253.  Id. at 611-12 (declining supplemental jurisdiction due to the complexity of the 
Colombian laws at issue). 
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death claims.254
Given the difficulty of showing that a district court abused its 
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign-
state tort law claims,255 litigants should anticipate that a court may decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims. 
4. Dismissal Based on International Comity 
Federal courts also may dismiss state law tort claims based upon 
doctrine of international comity.256  This doctrine is described as the 
“golden rule among nations”257 and as “the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of 
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who 
are under the protection of its laws.”258
In particular, the second strain of this doctrine, “comity among courts” 
or “adjudicatory comity,” is “viewed as a discretionary act of deference by 
a national court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly 
adjudicated in a foreign state.”259
Increasingly, courts may be of the view that a “true conflict” between 
the domestic law and foreign law is not a predicate or requirement for 
international comity.260  Courts have not required proof of a true conflict 
when considering application of adjudicatory comity.261  Instead, courts 
look to a list of factors bearing on their discretion to invoke comity.  A 
frequently cited list is taken from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
Ungaro-Benages v. Dredsner Bank Ag; it includes “[1] the strength of the 
 254. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing and 
affirming the district court’s decision to decline to consider the plaintiff’s wrongful death 
claim under Colombian law). 
 255.  See e.g., Drummond, 278 F.3d at 612 (finding that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion). 
 256.  See e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 596-97 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing 
a state law tort claim based on the doctrine of international comity).  
 257.  Id. at 608 (describing international comity). 
 258.  Id. at 597 (citations omitted) (discussing international comity); see also Societie
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 
522, 543 n. 27 (1987) (stating that “[c]omity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a 
domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other 
sovereign states”). 
 259.  Mujica, 771 F.3d at 599 (discussing a part of the international comity doctrine). 
 260.  Id. (refining the “true conflict” analysis to require proof of such a conflict “only in 
cases where prescriptive comity is at issue – that is, where a party claims that it is subject to 
conflicting regulatory schemes, such as antitrust laws or bankruptcy rules that apply 
extraterritorially”).
 261.  Id. at 601 (discussing international comity). 
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United States’ interests in using a foreign forum, [2] the strength of the 
foreign government’s interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative 
forum.”262  The Ninth Circuit has sub-divided the first factor, U.S. 
interests,263  and the third factor, adequacy of the forum,264 into additional 
lists of non-exclusive factors. 
These factors obviously can be case-specific and country-specific.  
However, they appear to offer courts which are disinclined to hear foreign 
tort law claims another basis for dismissal. 
III. THOUGHTS FOR A DISCUSSION OF POLICY AND 
COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION
In a democracy, the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence in the interest of public order.265  In practice however, 
PMCs act as an extension of the state.  Though governments may outsource 
some of their use-of-force function to PMCs, backlash against using PMCs 
can result - and the legitimacy of democracies can be questioned and 
eroded - if the public disapproves of a PMCs conduct.  Negative 
perceptions and consequences can result from incidents involving the 
perceived disproportionate use of force.266
Perhaps because the public perceives that the United States’ regulation 
and control of PMCs, and the government’s oversight process for 
contracting with PMCs,267 are well thought-out and sound, there is little 
reason to predict that the U.S.’s trend toward contracting with PMCs will 
decrease.  PMCs serving in Iraq alone, for example, have benefitted from 
annual contracts with the U.S. at an amount estimated to be more than $1 
 262.  Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank Ag, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 263.  Non-exclusive factors to assess U.S. interests include:  (1) the location of the 
conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (2) the character of the conduct in 
question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy 
interests. Mujica, 771 F.3d at 604; see id. at 607 (analyzing how foreign interests mirror 
that of U.S. interests).   
 264.  When evaluating the adequacy of the of the foreign forum, courts consider 
decisions rendered by that alternative forum and ask “(1) whether the judgment was 
rendered via fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing 
proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign judgment is 
prejudicial [and] . . . repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.” Id. at 
608 (citations omitted).   
 265.  See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
154 (Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (discussing the state’s use of violence). 
 266.  See O’Brien, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing PMCs in combat zones and their 
potential problems). 
 267.  See, e.g., id. at 27-28, 53-55 (noting the “FY2007 and FY2008 Defense 
Authorization Acts seek to reign in all PMCs and make them more accountable for 
actions”).
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billion.268  And the role of PMCs in that region has only appeared to grow 
with the myriad tasks that PMCs currently perform for the U.S. military.269
 As noted, coincident with democracies outsourcing more of their 
military functions to PMCs, private corporations - rather than appealing to 
governments for protection in, for example, the Middle East, or in shipping 
lanes off the east African coast – are increasingly contracting directly with 
PSCs to provide security in or near unstable regions outside the U.S.  
Instead of appealing to the U.S. government to use taxpayer funds to 
protect them or their personnel overseas, private companies increasingly 
short-circuit that process by paying for the security function themselves 
and hiring private companies to perform what, in some circumstances, 
would have in the past been a governmental function.  As one can see from, 
for example, the Citizen Services section of the website for the U.S. 
Embassy in Iraq, the United States is aware of this trend. 
Given that corporations chartered by states in the U.S. are contracting 
with private companies to provide services which the U.S. government (or 
governments aligned with it) have historically provided for U.S. interests 
overseas, it seems clear that the federal government has a legitimate 
interest in regulating that process.
All the above observations are easy.  As usual, the devil is in the 
details for any proposal to address them.   
Most would agree that the ATS is, by American standards, an ancient 
statute.  This Act and more recent case law interpreting it form much of the 
legal authority in this area, as supplemented by the TVPA and by garden-
variety tort, choice-of-law, and comity principles.  Given the growth in 
private corporations’ use of PSCs, some would argue that a better approach 
would be for Congress to preempt the current patchwork of laws from 
various areas with a modernized statute addressed specifically to private 
corporations’ contracting with PSCs to provide services outside the U.S.  
Advantages for the public, the U.S. government, the PSC industry, and its 
clients from a new statute could include: 
 Greater predictability in the law.  There are currently conflicts in the 
 268.  Id. at 1 (discussing U.S. contracts with PMCs during the military operations in 
Iraq). See, e.g., Junio Valerio Palomba, Private Military Companies and the Pursuit of 
Legitimacy, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.e-
ir.info/2009/10/02/private-military-security-companies-and-the-pursuit-of-legitimacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/9R3M-79JJ] (citing Rita Abrahamsen, Michael C. Williams, The 
Globalization of Private Security, ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/02) (Chatham House, London 
Oct. 2005) (stating that “[t]he current estimated value of the global private security sector is 
in fact close to $100 billion and it represents one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
economy worldwide”).
 269.  See, O’Brien, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing a recent situation where the U.S. 
employed PMCs). 
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case law which mean that clients of PSCs encounter different results 
depending on where in the U.S. they are sued.  Legislation can eliminate 
those conflicts.  And clearly drafted legislation would likely allow the PSC 
industry to plan and to conduct itself with greater legal precision than a 
body of law made up largely of court cases which can evolve sporadically 
and without public comment being received.  
 Greater comfort on the part of the public with the PSC industry.  
Many of the concerns about PSC activities could be addressed with better 
transparency.  Legislation could enable a certification body, and provide 
for the promulgation of standards to be met before PSCs could enter 
contracts with private corporations.
If the public perceives that a capable body has promulgated sensible 
standards for PSCs, and that PSCs are required to meet those standards 
before being permitted to contract with private corporations, some concerns 
around the PSC industry might be significantly reduced.  
 Business and efficiency concerns.  Similar to, but distinct from, 
issues of clarity in the law for those who bring or defend actions against 
PSC clients, are issues of business efficiency.  Litigation to the side, putting 
all the rules in one place in a preemptive, well thought-out piece of 
legislation would better allow PSCs and their clients to execute business 
plans in a way that plans to obey the law and avoid litigation in the first 
instance.  This is a legitimate business concern.  From a purely business 
perspective, avoiding litigation is its own reward. 
On the flip side, both claimants’ firms and claimants themselves have 
financial (as opposed to legal) concerns about the costs vs. benefits of 
embarking down a litigation path.  Again, a single, preemptive body of 
clear law would better allow claimants and their lawyers to weigh the 
business pros and cons in determining whether and how to initiate and 
execute litigation. 
 International confidence in the United States’ policy.  PSCs are 
often populated by alumni of western militaries.  PSCs are also often 
headquartered in western democracies, including the U.S.  In addition, the 
corporate clients of PSCs are very often U.S. or western companies (whose 
appetites for PSC services show little sign of abating). 
In these circumstances, the U.S. Government’s having a modern, 
clear, and sensible plan for oversight of a growing private industry which 
has the capability to apply deadly force is appropriate.  Being aware of the 
industry’s growth, recognizing the need for the industry in the private 
sector, and responding with a modern legal scheme would indicate that the 
United States’ government is aware and responsible.  
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CONCLUSION
Corporations employing personnel or maintaining facilities in or near 
unstable regions of the world, or near areas where terrorist acts can occur, 
are increasingly likely to retain PSCs.  To perform the functions for which 
they are engaged, PSC personnel are at times armed.  Given the functions 
for which PSCs are retained and the environments where they work, client 
corporations should not be surprised if incidents involving the use of force 
sometimes occur. 
When these incidents occur, affected members of the local population 
sometimes seek to bring legal action against the client corporations in the 
U.S.  As shown above, client corporations have a number of relatively 
well-established defenses and defensive theories to assert in response. 
